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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW–INVERSE CONDEMNATION: 
DECISION THAT A TEMPORARY MORATORIUM DOES NOT 
AMOUNT TO A COMPENSABLE TAKING SIGNIFIES A 
VICTORY FOR LAND-USE PLANNERS 
Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 
2005 ND 193, 705 N.W.2d 850 
I. FACTS 
Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. (Wild Rice) is the owner and developer 
of a rural residential subdivision located along the Wild Rice River approxi-
mately three miles south of Fargo, North Dakota.1  Anton Rutten (Rutten) 
owned Wild Rice and acquired the farmland in 1947 in anticipation that it 
would one day become a part of Fargo.2  In addition to the possible annex-
ation, Rutten hoped to develop a subdivision on the property.3 
In 1993, the subdivision was platted and contained thirty-eight lots, 
sixteen of which were located on an oxbow of the Wild Rice River.4  In 
1994, the subdivision was incorporated as Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. in 
order to continue its development.5  From 1994 to 1997, Wild Rice invested 
approximately $500,000 to “develop and promote the subdivision.”6 
In April 1997, the Wild Rice River and the nearby Red River flooded 
the region.7  All of the undeveloped lots in the Wild Rice subdivision were 
underwater.8  After the flood, Fargo worked with the Federal Emergency 
 
1. Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 2005 ND 193, ¶ 2, 705 N.W.2d 850, 852. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id.  An oxbow is “a U-shaped bend in a river.”  THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 
517 (New ed. 2004). 
5. Wild Rice, ¶ 2, 705 N.W.2d at 852.  Anton Rutten was the sole shareholder and only 
officer and director of Wild Rice until his death in 2002.  Appellee’s Brief at 6, Wild Rice River 
Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 2005 ND 193, 705 N.W.2d 850 (No. 20050074).  Upon his death, 
his widow, Frederica Rutten, became the sole stockholder and their daughter, Bonnie Rutten, 
became the president, secretary, treasurer, and manager of Wild Rice.  Id. 
6. Wild Rice, ¶ 2, 705 N.W.2d at 853. 
7. Id. ¶ 3.  Prior to the flooding, the City of Fargo experienced a “record snowfall of 140 
inches” beginning in February of 1997.  Appellee’s Brief, supra note 5, at 8.  Although the Red 
River Valley, encompassing both the Wild Rice and Red River, has a history of flooding, the April 
1997 flood was unique to the area in that “[c]ity officials had never before experienced flooding 
from the Wild Rice River in addition to flood waters from the Red River.”  Id.  As a result, the 
flood waters “inundated the City of Fargo and surrounding areas causing unprecedented damage.”  
Id. 
8. Wild Rice, ¶ 3, 705 N.W.2d at 853.  Rutten’s partially constructed home, which was on 
one of the lots, was also partly damaged.  Id.  The flood waters came within one foot of the 
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Management Agency (FEMA) to develop a plan for future floods.9  The 
Wild Rice subdivision was subsumed within Fargo’s extraterritorial juris-
diction on August 1, 1997.10  On June 15, 1998, FEMA created a prelimi-
nary flood insurance rate-map for the area, which included several of the 
Wild Rice lots in the preliminary floodway.11  The City determined that the 
FEMA map was the best information to use in developing a floodway along 
the Wild Rice River.12 
While FEMA was completing its study of the area, the City continued 
to receive requests for building permits in Wild Rice and other areas.13  
These requests concerned city officials, due to the areas’ location within the 
initial FEMA floodway plan.14  Therefore, the City had to consider the 
necessity of allowing construction in the preliminary floodway against the 
FEMA regulations.15  On August 10, 1998, the Fargo City Commission 
placed a moratorium “on the issuance of all building permits for new con-
struction in the floodway within the City of Fargo and its four-mile extrater-
ritorial zone.”16  The City intended the moratorium to remain in effect until 
 
foundation of Rutten’s home and ground water seeped into the home through a window.  
Appellee’s Brief, supra note 5, at 9.  However, the other existing homes were not harmed.  Wild 
Rice, ¶ 3, 705 N.W.2d at 853. 
9. Wild Rice, ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 853.  FEMA had begun to study the Wild Rice River prior 
to the 1997 flood, at which time the river had a designated floodplain but no floodway.  
Appellee’s Brief, supra note 5, at 10.  The main difference between a floodplain and a floodway is 
that “[a] person can build in the floodplain assuming he or she otherwise meets floodproofing 
requirements, but FEMA does not ever allow a person to build in the floodway.”  Id. (internal 
citations omitted).  “The floodplain is the land that would be inundated by a hundred-year flood 
event[,] [while] [t]he floodway is the area where the water of the river actually flows to the 
hundred–year discharge point.”  Id.  When the 1997 flood occurred, FEMA was in the initial 
stages of developing a floodway and updating a flood insurance rate-map.  Id.  Following the un-
precedented flood in 1997, however, FEMA recommenced the process in order to comprehen-
sively review the area.  Id. 
10. Wild Rice, ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 853.  The City of Fargo’s extraterritorial jurisdiction 
amounted to a four mile zone, which surrounded the preliminary floodway and was covered by the 
imposition of the temporary moratorium.  Appellee’s Brief, supra note 5, at 11. 
11. Wild Rice, ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 853.  The flood insurance rate-map designated a 
preliminary floodway for many of the areas in the Red River Valley as well as areas along the 
Wild Rice River.  Appellee’s Brief, supra note 5, at 10. 
12. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 5, at 10. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 10-11. 
16. Wild Rice, ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 853.  A moratorium is defined as “a suspension of 
activity.”  THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 470 (New ed. 2004).  “Regulatory agencies 
across the country have used temporary moratoria and interim development controls as a legiti-
mate means of creating breathing space while necessary background data is gathered, analyses 
conducted, and policies assessed.”  Robert H. Freilich, Time, Space, and Value in Inverse 
Condemnation: A Unified Theory for Partial Takings Analysis, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 589, 601 
(2002).  In general, four main principles underlie the imposition and need for temporary 
moratoria.  Id. at 602. 
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both the Fargo City Ordinances passed, and FEMA made a final determina-
tion on the floodplain map.17  Consequently, the moratorium affected sev-
eral Wild Rice lots during the twenty-one months it remained in effect.18 
Rutten’s daughter, Bonnie Rutten, applied for a building permit in May 
of 1999 to construct a home on one of Wild Rice’s lots.19  The City of 
Fargo denied the permit because the lot was located in FEMA’s preliminary 
designated floodway and was covered by the moratorium.20  While the mor-
atorium was in effect, several buyers also showed an interest in purchasing 
Wild Rice lots.21  In fact, “one potential buyer signed two purchase agree-
ments and another [buyer] signed a lot-hold agreement.”22  However, the 
moratorium’s constraint on the ability to attain permits for construction 
prevented the sale of any Wild Rice lots.23 
Subsequently, Wild Rice initiated an inverse condemnation action on 
March 30, 2000, claiming that the moratorium constituted a taking of its 
property.24  In response, the City of Fargo filed an answer on April 21, 
2000.25  Fargo’s city engineer recommended, in writing, that the city com-
missioners lift the moratorium and that FEMA’s June 15, 1998 “preliminary 
 
First, reasonable moratoria allow the regulating body the necessary time to study and 
formulate solutions to significant land use and environmental problems affecting 
society. . . . 
. . . . 
Second, temporary moratoria also constitute a valid response to imminent public 
health and safety threats. . . . 
. . . . 
The third principle underlying the need for temporary planning moratoria is the 
prevention of nonconforming uses or development inconsistent with the purposes and 
policies of the planning legislation being formulated. . . . 
. . . . 
[Finally,] [t]he fourth principle underlying temporary planning moratoria is the 
facilitation of public debate and input into the legislative process. 
Id. at 602-05. 
17. Wild Rice, ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 853. 
18. Id.  Several of the Wild Rice lots were affected by the moratorium due to their location 
within the preliminary floodway developed by FEMA in June of 1998.  Appellee’s Brief, supra 
note 5, at 11.  FEMA’s floodway approval process generally takes eighteen months.  Id. at 10.  
Therefore, the City believed the floodway designation process would be complete within a similar 
amount of time, during which time, city, state, and federal officials met to discuss “flood plan 
mitigation issues.”  Wild Rice, ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 853. 





24. Id. ¶ 6.  Rutten also based his suit against the City of Fargo on a claim of tortious 
interference.  Id. 
25. Id. 
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flood insurance rate-map panel [serve] as the governing panel for all flood-
prone areas.”26  Therefore, the city commission voted to lift the moratorium 
during a public hearing on May 1, 2000.27 
After the City of Fargo lifted the moratorium, Wild Rice sold five of its 
lots.28  A potential buyer who signed a purchase agreement while the mora-
torium was in place, purchased a lot for $32,900 in May of 2000.29  “Lots 
were also purchased in March 2002 for $39,000, in November 2002 for 
$39,000, in July 2003 for $55,900, and in April 2004 for $59,900.”30  Other 
sales were also pending during these proceedings.31 
Wild Rice’s inverse condemnation lawsuit appeared before Judge 
Douglas R. Herman in the District Court of Cass County, East Central 
Judicial District, North Dakota on October 25-28, 2004.32  Wild Rice chal-
lenged the moratorium, alleging that the government exceeded its power to 
restrict land use by limiting Wild Rice’s property rights, which effectively 
amounted to a taking.33  Wild Rice asserted its inverse condemnation claim 
under both the federal and state constitutions.34 
The district court dismissed the claim after a bench trial.35  The court 
concluded that the twenty-one month moratorium imposed by the City of 
Fargo did not constitute a taking of Wild Rice’s property.36  Wild Rice 
appealed the dismissal to the North Dakota Supreme Court.37  Wild Rice 
asserted that the “[trial] court erred in dismissing its claim for inverse con-
demnation because Fargo’s [twenty-one]-month moratorium constituted a 
‘taking’ of its property.”38  The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed and 








32. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 5, at 5. 
33. Wild Rice, ¶ 9, 705 N.W.2d at 854. 
34. Id. ¶ 11. 
35. Id. ¶ 8, 705 N.W.2d at 853-54. 
36. Id. at 853.  Additionally, the trial court ruled in favor of Fargo by determining that “no 
malicious interference with third-party contracts” had occurred.  Id. at 853-54.  The court also 
denied Wild Rice’s post-trial motions.  Id. at 854. 
37. Id. ¶ 1, 705 N.W.2d at 852. 
38. Id. ¶ 9, 705 N.W.2d at 854. 
39. Id. ¶ 1, 705 N.W.2d at 852. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Property plays a crucial role in American society.40  Although property 
is not defined in the United States Constitution, the opportunity to acquire 
and possess property is a right recognized as one of the foundations of our 
political system.41  In fact, “‘[t]he protection of property ownership is a 
fundamental theme’ in the Constitution” at both the federal and state 
levels.42  Therefore, to adequately address the importance of property own-
ership in the United States, this section will focus on the role that property 
has played through a presentation of both the federal and state takings 
jurisprudence. 
A. FEDERAL TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
In general, the United States Supreme Court has defined real property 
broadly.43  Conversely, the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution has been narrowly applied.44  The Takings 
Clause provides that private property shall not “be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”45  In this context, the term “takings” refers to 
situations where property owners are compelled to transfer their interests in 
real or personal property to governmental entities.46 
However, the Takings Clause does not automatically prohibit govern-
mental interference with property rights.47  Instead, the Clause’s purpose is 
to ensure that property owners are compensated when the government takes 
 
40. See Brian J. Nolan, Note, The Metaphysics of Property: Looking Beneath the Surface of 
Regulatory Takings Law After Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 703, 708 (2004) (“Property rights hold a unique place in the 
American system.”). 
41. Id. 
42. Akke Levin, Note, Camping in Lake Tahoe: Does a Temporary Deprivation of All 
Beneficial Use of Land Justify Rejection of the Categorical Lucas Rule?, 4 NEV. L.J. 448, 449 
(2004) (quoting Kimberly Horsely, Comment, The Abnormalcy of Normal Delay, 28 PEPP. L. 
REV. 415, 415 (2001)). 
43. Inversely Yours: Substantive Issues in Inverse Condemnation, Continuing Legal Educa-
tion at Vinson & Elkins L.L.P., Houston, Tex. (Jan. 5-7, 2006) available at SL049 ALI-ABA 623, 
628.  Property has been held to include not only real estate and personal property, but also such 
things as easements, trade secret rights, valid contracts, franchises, and trade routes.  Id. at 628-29. 
44. Id. at 628. 
45. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.  “While the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that the gov-
ernment must pay just compensation for any land taken for public purpose is straightforward, it 
has proven difficult in application.”  Martin J. Foncello, Comment, Adverse Possession and 
Takings Seldom Compensation for Chance Happenings, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 667, 668 (2005).  
As a result, federal takings law is relatively unsettled.  Id. at 667-68. 
46. Brent L. Slipka, Case Comment, Constitutional Law—Inverse Condemnation: Supreme 
Court Gives Property Owners New Rights, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), 78 
N.D. L. REV. 177, 179 (2002). 
47. Levin, supra note 42, at 449. 
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their property for public use.48  The Takings Clause effectively serves as a 
guarantee “designed to bar government from forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole.”49  This section explains the progression of the 
Takings Clause through the United States’ Supreme Court’s decisions 
regarding: (1) regulatory takings; (2) a per se categorical rule for regulatory 
takings; (3) an ad hoc factual inquiry for regulatory takings; and (4) 
temporary regulatory takings. 
1. Regulatory Takings 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporated the 
Takings Clause, thereby making it applicable to the states.50  Nonetheless, 
when a state seeks to deprive a private property owner of their property, the 
Due Process Clause only affords the state the right to do so through preex-
isting laws and other forms of fair adjudication.51  One such way that a state 
may regulate private property is through an exercise of its police power.52 
 
48. Id.  Under the Takings Clause, “[t]he ‘public use’ limitation prescribes that the govern-
ment may not take land for whatever purpose it pleases, but may only take for a public purpose.”  
Foncello, supra note 45, at 672.  Additionally, this limitation requires that for a taking to be 
considered for public use, it must bear a rational relationship to a conceivable public purpose.  Id.  
When making this determination, reviewing courts show deference to the decisions of the 
legislature regarding what constitutes a public use and it is generally believed that few takings fail 
to meet this standard.  Id. at 673.  “The second limitation, the payment of ‘just compensation,’ is a 
fundamental limitation on the actions of the state.”  Id.  It basically provides that property owners 
should be “fully indemnified for the loss sustained when his property is taken for public use.”  Id.  
However, private property owners are only compensated for the losses that they actually suffer, 
not for benefits gained by the government.  Id. 
49. Levin, supra note 42, at 449-50 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960)).  This principle was first recognized in Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960), and later enshrined as the “Armstrong principle” in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 320-21 (2002).  Steven J. Eagle, Planning 
Moratoria and Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court’s Fairness Mandate Benefits 
Landowners, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 429, 442 (2004); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of 
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (restating the principle set forth in Armstrong); Armstrong, 
364 U.S. at 49 (establishing the principle that governments should not be allowed to force 
individual landowners to bear public burdens alone and stressing the importance of the quest for 
fairness and justice in takings determinations); “Character of the Governmental Action” in 
Takings Law: Past, Present, and Future, Continuing Legal Education at George Mason University 
School of Law, Arlington, Virginia (Apr. 22-24, 2004) available at SJ052 ALI-ABA 459, 464-65 
(discussing the decision in Armstrong and reiterating the importance of the concepts of fairness 
and justice in takings determinations). 
50. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005).  The Fourteenth Amendment 
was made applicable to the states when it was adopted in 1868.  Carl Kirk, Note, First Church 
Decides Compensation is Remedy for Temporary Regulatory Takings—Local Governments are 
‘Singing the Blues,’ 21 IND. L. REV. 901, 904 (1988). 
51. Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
187, 196 (2004) [hereinafter Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court].  On its own, the Due 
Process Clause does not guarantee any substantive rights.  Id.  See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
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State and local governments have broad authority to enact land use 
regulations through their police power.53  This authority essentially enables 
governments to impose regulations without having to compensate the land-
owners whose property is restricted.54  Initially, these land use regulations 
were not subject to scrutiny under the Takings Clause.55  Instead, only 
situations of direct government appropriation or actual physical invasion of 
a person’s private property were deemed to be Fifth Amendment Takings.56  
However, over time, the United States Supreme Court began to classify 
certain government regulations of private property as compensable Fifth 
Amendment Takings because the regulations were so substantial that the 
effect created a “regulatory taking.”57 
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,58 the United States Supreme Court 
first recognized the concept of “regulatory takings.”59  In Mahon, the 
Pennsylvania Coal Company sold surface rights to specific parcels of 
property while reserving the right to mine the coal beneath.60  The com-
pany’s property and contract rights were subsequently affected by a statute 
which forbade “the mining of anthracite coal in such way as to cause the 
subsidence of . . . any structure used as a human habitation.”61 
 
§ 1, cl. 3 (providing through the Due Process Clause no state shall “deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law”). 
52. David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces for the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History 
Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 499 (2004). 
53. Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505, 507 (N.D. 1983).  The concept of police 
power has been understood as the authority through which state or local governments regulate 
property and land use for an appropriate public purpose.  Thomas, supra note 52, at 499.  Appro-
priate public purposes under the police power involve “land use regulations that preserve or 
protect the public health, safety, morals, or welfare.”  Id. at 544. 
54. Rippley, 330 N.W.2d at 507.  Generally, the Fifth Amendment requires just compensa-
tion for a taking of private property for public use.  Thomas, supra note 52, at 544.  When 
enacting land use regulations under the police power, however, a requirement for compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment is not presumed.  Id.  This lack of compensation is likely related to 
the fact that the use of the police power comprises a much narrower category than that of general 
public uses under the Takings Clause.  Id.  Historically, police power regulations have generally 
been limited to “regulating conduct to which the landowner had no right anyway,” primarily as a 
means to prevent landowners from using their land in a manner which amounted to a nuisance.  Id. 
at 545.  No landowner has a right to use their land in this way; therefore, no loss or “taking” of 
anything was caused by the regulation.  Id. at 543-44. 
55. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537. 
56. Id.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, “it was 
generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property, or the 
functional equivalent of a ‘practical ouster of [the owner’s] possession.’”  Id. (quoting Lucas v. 
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (emphasis in original)). 
57. Id. 
58. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
59. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (discussing the Mahon Court’s 
decision that certain “regulatory takings” are compensable under the Fifth Amendment). 
60. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412. 
61. Id. at 412-13. 
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In its decision, the Mahon Court focused on whether the statute consti-
tuted a legitimate exercise of police power in regulating a potential safety 
threat to surface owners.62  The Mahon Court determined that the statute’s 
prohibition made it impossible for the company to mine coal and, in es-
sence, completely destroyed all of the rights that the company had reserved 
from the surface landowners.63  As a result, the Court found the statute to be 
invalid because the prohibition amounted to a “taking,” for which just 
compensation had not been paid.64 
The Court recognized that the United States Constitution protects pri-
vate property ownership from physical appropriation.65  This protection is 
afforded by the limits placed on the government’s power to define a prop-
erty owner’s interests.66  These limitations serve as a fundamental check on 
the government’s ability to restrict the rights of private property owners.67  
Without these limits, human nature itself would naturally cause the un-
checked restriction of property and ultimately the disappearance of all 
private property.68 
These considerations led to the adoption of a general rule that “while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if [a] regulation goes too far it 
will be recognized as a taking.”69  However, the decision in Mahon offered 
little guidance as to when, and under which circumstances, a given 
regulation would be seen as having gone “too far” under the Takings 
 
62. Id. at 413-14. 
63. Id. at 414.  The Pennsylvania Coal Company could not be forbidden from mining the 
coal through the state’s exercise of its police power, because the company reserved the right to 
mine it through the deed maintained by the homeowners.  Id.  Therefore, the homeowners had 
waived their claims to damages from this mining.  Id.  Damage to a single house also does not 
constitute a public nuisance justifying the use of the state’s police power because it is not common 
to all homeowners of the area or public in nature.  Id. at 413.  However, even if it was common to 
all homeowners in the area, the homeowners still deeded away their right to claim damages of this 
sort by allowing the company to reserve its right to mine the coal.  Id. at 416. 
64. Id. at 414-15; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127-
28 (1978) (discussing the Court’s holding in Mahon). 
65. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415-16; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 
(1992) (discussing Justice Holmes’ reasoning in Mahon). 
66. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415-16. 
67. Id. at 415. 
68. See id. (providing that when the “seemingly absolute protection [of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments] is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of hu-
man nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears”). 
69. Id.  Generally, a taking has been determined to likely occur “when a regulation concen-
trates economic injuries disproportionately on a few individuals.”  Charles V. Dumas, III, Note, 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency: The Supreme Court 
Reaffirms the Importance of Land-Use Planning and Wisely Refuses to Set Concrete Outer Limits, 
53 CATH. U. L. REV. 209, 211 (2003).  When making determinations of this sort, the law 
specifically seeks to find a “middle ground between avoiding individualized economic burdens 
and meeting the goals of necessary land-use planning.”  Id.  In essence it strives to “strike a 
balance between the rights of individual property owners and the public.”  Id. 
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Clause.70  As a result, the determination of what constitutes a “taking” for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment has been met with considerable 
difficulty.71 
2. Per Se Categorical Rule of Regulatory Takings 
In an effort to clarify the uncertainty surrounding the determination of 
when a regulation goes “too far,” the United States Supreme Court has 
established two bright-line rules.72  These bright-line rules are applicable 
when a physical invasion has occurred and where a regulation denies all 
economic use of property.73  The bright-line, or categorical per se rule, was 
first recognized in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council74 and applied 
to regulations denying all economic use of property.75 
In Lucas, a takings claim was alleged in response to a ban placed on 
coastal development.76  A property owner purchased beachfront lots and 
had planned to build single-family homes.77  Two years after his purchase, 
the state of South Carolina enacted legislation that established an erosion 
line and barred all new development within twenty feet of the erosion line.78  
This legislation prevented the property owner from building on his lots due 
to their location within twenty feet of the erosion line.79  The Court deter-
mined that a regulatory taking had occurred because the legislation 
essentially deprived the property owner of all reasonable economic use of 
his property, thereby rendering the property valueless.80 
The Lucas Court reiterated the now famous passage from Mahon: 
“[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes 
too far it will be recognized as a taking.”81  The Lucas Court determined 
 
70. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
71. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978). 
72. A Short History of Regulatory Takings—Where We Have Been and What are the Hot 
Issues of Today, Continuing Legal Education at Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California 
(Sept. 29-Oct. 1, 2005) available at SL012 ALI-ABA 1, 25. 
73. Id. at 25. 
74. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
75. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016. 
76. Id. at 1009. 
77. Id. at 1006-07. 
78. Id. at 1007. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 1029-30; see also Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra note 51, at 206 
(discussing the Court’s holding in Lucas). 
81. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (quoting Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).  
In his explanation of the distinction between total and partial restraints, Justice Scalia, who wrote 
the majority opinion, stated that: 
[I]n the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use 
of land is permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the 
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that property owners have suffered takings when they are required to sacri-
fice all economically beneficial uses of their property by leaving the prop-
erty economically idle.82  In these instances, the property owners do not 
receive any benefit in return for giving up specific rights or uses to their 
property as required by and set forth in the regulation to aid the common 
good.83  As a result, property owners are forced to bear public burdens 
alone, while not receiving any benefit in return for their property.84  Also, 
the State can avoid compensating a property owner only if the proscribed 
uses were not part of the property owner’s title when it was acquired.85  In 
essence, the Lucas per se rule seeks to prevent private property from being 
“pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating 
serious public harm” through the government’s exercise of its police 
power.86  The Lucas decision resulted in a major victory for property 
owners because it provided that regulations, which deprive landowners of 
all economic use of their land, amount to takings that require compensa-
tion.87  This principle holds true regardless of whether important govern-
mental interests are served by the regulations.88 
However, the Court stressed that this per se rule only applies in those 
cases where a regulation denies a property owner all beneficial use of his or 
 
legislature is simply ‘adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life.’  [Rather, 
such regulations] carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being 
pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public 
harm. 
Id. at 1017-18 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) 
(cited in Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra note 51, at 206)). 
82. Id. at 1019; see also Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra note 51, at 206 
(“[A]n owner suffers a per se taking when his economic losses reach 100%.”). 
83. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18; see also Levin, supra note 42, at 455 (discussing the 
application and effect of the categorical rule created by the Lucas court). 
84. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018. 
85. Id. at 1027; see also Dumas, supra note 69, at 215 (reiterating the principle set forth in 
Lucas). 
86. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018; see also Kimberly A. Selemba, The Interplay Between Property 
Law and Constitutional Law: How the Government (Un)Constitutionally “Takes” Land Dirt 
Cheap, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 657, 662 (2003) (discussing the categorical per se rule recognized 
in Lucas).  The Lucas Court proffered three reasons in support of its determination that a 
deprivation of all economically beneficial use of land amounts to a taking.  Ann Oshiro, Note, 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency: A Significant Ripple 
in Takings Jurisprudence, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 167, 186 (2004).  First, the Court reasoned that it is 
unrealistic to simply assume that the government has adjusted the benefits and burdens of eco-
nomic life in order to secure an average reciprocity of advantage to all property owners and parties 
concerned.  Id.  Second, the Court determined that requiring the government to compensate 
property owners will not have a negative impact on the government’s power and ability to regulate 
because the Lucas rule only applies in rare situations.  Id.  Third and finally, the Court reiterated 
the belief that if compensation is not required in situations where the categorical Lucas rule 
applies, it creates a risk of forcing property into the realm of public service.  Id. 
87. Oshiro, supra note 86, at 178-79. 
88. Id. at 179. 
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her property.89  As a result, even when a regulation diminishes the value of 
a landowner’s property by ninety-five percent, the Lucas framework does 
not apply.90  Therefore, anything less than a total taking must be analyzed 
under a partial taking analysis.91 
3. Ad Hoc Factual Inquiry for Regulatory Takings 
State and federal governments regularly impose regulations which do 
not deprive landowners of all economically beneficial use of their prop-
erty.92  Nevertheless, regulations still restrict the ability of property owners 
to use their property.93  Therefore, under certain circumstances a regulation 
can amount to a “partial regulatory taking.”94  The United States Supreme 
Court has not developed a bright-line formula to determine when justice 
and fairness require the government to compensate landowners’ economic 
injuries.95  In turn, this determination is often made on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into account the particular circumstances involved.96 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,97 the United 
States Supreme Court recognized that when engaging in these case-by-case 
determinations, or “ad hoc factual inquiries,” several factors are particularly 
significant.98  These factors are “[(1)] [t]he economic impact of the regula-
tion on the claimant[;] . . . [(2)] the extent to which the regulation has 
 
89. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, n.8.  Additionally, the categorical Lucas rule does not apply 
when a regulation only amounts to a prohibition of a use that has been recognized as a common 
nuisance.  Levin, supra note 42, at 455. 
90. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, n.8. 
91. Levin, supra note 42, at 455. 
92. Dumas, supra note 69, at 216.  Zoning laws provide an example of regulations that do 
not deny a landowner of all economically beneficial use of their property.  Id. at 216 n.47.  A 
specific example of a zoning regulation would be that of “[a] landmark preservation ordinance . . . 
that prohibits certain types of property development [and] may affect the value of that property 
without rendering it valueless to the owner.”  Id. at 216.  “While zoning at times reduces 
individual property values, the burden is shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to conclude 
that on the whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect of the zoning will be benefited by 
another.”  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 147 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis in original).  Therefore, zoning laws have been consistently viewed as 
permissible governmental actions even when the laws prohibit the most beneficial use of the 
property.  Dumas, supra note 69, at 218. 
93. Dumas, supra note 69, at 216. 
94. Id.  A “partial regulatory taking” has been defined as a deprivation which is less than the 
entire use or value of the property or interest therein.  Eagle, supra note 49, at 461. 
95. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
96. Id. 
97. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
98. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
      
1064 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:1053 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations[;] . . . [and] [(3)] the 
character of the governmental action.”99 
In Penn Central, a property owner brought a takings claim against the 
City of New York after the city refused to approve construction plans for a 
fifty-story office building over Grand Central Terminal.100  The construc-
tion was not approved due to the City’s designation of Grand Central 
Terminal as a landmark under New York City’s Landmarks Preservation 
Law.101  The Supreme Court ruled that a taking may occur under a land 
regulation even where that regulation falls short of eliminating all economi-
cally beneficial use.102  Moreover, when analyzing potential takings, the 
parcel of property in question must be viewed as a whole and not divided 
into segments to determine if the rights of one segment were completely 
extinguished.103 
“There are practical planning and administrative reasons for consid-
ering the entire property when determining whether regulatory impact 
amounts to a taking.”104  After all, if courts based their takings analysis only 
upon the affected parcels, serious consequences would likely result.105  
Specifically, the government would have to compensate property owners 
 
99. Id.  These factors have been referred to as the “Penn Central analysis.”  Slipka, supra 
note 46, at 181.  Based on these factors, “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the 
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when 
interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life 
to promote the common good.”  Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (internal citations omitted). 
 For discussions of the economic impact factor, see, e.g., Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 57 
Fed. Cl. 115, 123 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (“[T]he proper measure of economic impact is the comparison 
of the market value of the property immediately before the governmental action with the market 
value of that same property immediately after the action.”); Leon County v. Gluesenkamp, 873 
So. 2d 460, 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that the economic impact criterion of the Penn 
Central analysis requires a plaintiff to establish a serious financial loss as a result of the 
regulation). 
 For discussions of the character of governmental action factor, see, e.g., Bass Enters. Prod. 
Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (recognizing that a taking can result 
when an extraordinary delay, which the Supreme Court and other courts have defined as requiring 
a “substantial length of time,” occurs in the governmental decisionmaking process); Appollo 
Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 717, 737 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (relying on the Wyatt decision’s 
determination that takings can result from extraordinary delays in the governmental decision-
making process only upon a finding of extreme circumstances); Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 
1090, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that takings may occur through an extraordinary delay in 
the governmental decisionmaking process, however, acknowledging that a delay must be substan-
tial and that delays lasting up to eight years have been condoned by the Supreme Court); Byrd v. 
City of Hartsville, 620 S.E.2d 76, 82 (S.C. 2005) (holding that a two-month delay did not amount 
to a taking and that the City’s zoning regulation was not unreasonable). 
100. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 115-19. 
101. Id. at 115-16. 
102. Id. at 124 (outlining the pertinent factors for analysis). 
103. Id. at 130-31. 
104. Freilich, supra note 16, at 616. 
105. Id. 
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for de minimis impacts caused by regulations, regardless of the remaining 
usefulness of the parcels as a whole.106   
Ultimately, the Court held that Penn Central did not suffer a taking.107  
The Court found that the property owners retained beneficial use of their 
property, including the opportunity to enhance and develop additional prop-
erties in their possession.108  Also, the Court determined that the company 
based its claim primarily on development potential, which was a dimension 
of property not recognized under the factors set forth by the Court.109 
Penn Central serves as the main guide in the resolution of regulatory 
takings claims falling outside the scope of physical takings or those 
depriving owners of all economically beneficial use of their property.110  
When the Court decides regulatory takings claims, it balances an owner’s 
lost economic value and expectations against the social value the govern-
ment hopes to gain through the regulation.111  Instead of supplying precise 
variables, this balancing test provides important guideposts to use in the 
final determination of whether just compensation is required.112  Penn 
Central essentially refined the holding of Mahon to conform it to modern 
sensibilities and firmly established a basic interest balancing test for 
regulatory takings.113 
As a whole, this analysis favors the government.114  It presumes that 
regulations have high social value if they are reasonably related to the 
promotion of general welfare.115  Nevertheless, when a regulation causes a 
property owner to experience a concrete economic loss, the analysis favors 
 
106. Id. 
107. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138.  The Court determined that “[t]he restrictions imposed are 
substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare.”  Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra note 51, at 197. 
110. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). 
111. Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1549, 1556 (2003) [hereinafter Claeys, Takings]. 
112. Dumas, supra note 69, at 220. 
113. Oshiro, supra note 86, at 176; see also Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra 
note 51, at 192 (stating that the Penn Central decision “announced a utilitarian interest-balancing 
formula”). 
114. Claeys, Takings, supra note 111, at 1557. 
115. Id.  The social gains expected by the regulation are “concrete, immediate, and substan-
tial” whenever it is found to be “‘reasonably related to the promotion of the general welfare.’”  
Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra note 51, at 193 (quoting Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978)).  “On the other side, any social gains 
from protecting the institution of property rights seem diffuse and remote.”  Id.  The deferential 
nature of this analysis places it at odds with other balancing tests in property law.  Claeys, 
Takings, supra note 111, at 1557.  These other tests have a tendency to discount the social value of 
given land uses if they interfere with an owner’s ability to exercise free action over his or her 
property.  Id.  For example, nuisance law stresses that “it is in the general public interest to permit 
the free play of individual initiative within limits.”  Id. 
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the property owner.116  In general, however, the decision in Penn Central 
further provides support for the government.117  After all, in Penn Central’s 
wake, property owners, in essence, relinquished their right to complain a-
bout their inability to develop undeveloped property or to use their property 
for other purposes.118  As long as the owner retains some use of their prop-
erty, the law discourages complaints based on the potential to develop other 
uses.119 
4. Temporary Regulatory Takings 
In the case of temporary regulatory takings, all reasonable use of the 
property has not been destroyed because future uses remain.120  When tem-
porary regulations restrict the use of property, it is only the temporal aspect 
of the property that is affected, not all of the rights and uses associated with 
it.121  As a result, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency,122 the Supreme Court decided that Lucas’s per 
se rule is inapplicable in cases involving temporary takings.123 
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency imposed a 
thirty-two month moratorium to protect the water clarity of Lake Tahoe by 
barring the development of specific zones surrounding the lake.124  The 
main issue in Tahoe-Sierra involved a determination of whether a tem-
porary taking of this nature sufficiently impeded all economically viable 
uses of the property so as to constitute a taking under the Lucas standard.125  
The Tahoe-Sierra Court found that if a regulation is temporary in nature, or 
if any value or use remains with the property, the Lucas per se standard is 
inapplicable.126 
 
116. Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra note 51, at 193. 
117. Id. 
118. See id. (explaining that as long as owners are left with some use of their property, the 
law discourages complaints about their potential to develop other uses). 
119. Id. 
120. Freilich, supra note 16, at 615. 
121. Id. at 614. 
122. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
123. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333.  The Tahoe-Sierra Court recognized that the categorical 
Lucas rule was carved out for the “‘extraordinary circumstance’ in which the government deprives 
a property owner of all economic use.”  Id. at 337 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992)). 
124. Id. at 306-07. 
125. Id. at 306; see also Freilich, supra note 16, at 592-93 (discussing the factual background 
and issues presented in Tahoe-Sierra). 
126. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32.  “No court has yet held that a temporary moratorium 
can result in a Lucas-type taking.  Indeed, all the decisions are to the contrary.”  Freilich, supra 
note 16, at 613.  Additionally, in its determination that the Lucas standard does not apply to 
temporary takings of this sort, the Court has confirmed that Penn Central continues to remain the 
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In Tahoe-Sierra, the moratorium only placed a ban on the property for 
a limited period of time and, therefore, the future developmental use of the 
property was preserved.127  Future developmental use has substantial pre-
sent value, which differentiates it from a permanent ban on the development 
of property.128  The Tahoe-Sierra Court further explained, “[g]iven the 
importance and long-standing use [of] temporary moratoria, courts should 
be exceedingly reluctant to adopt rulings that would threaten the survival of 
this crucial planning mechanism.”129 
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court also determined that delays in the sale or 
development of property during the imposition of a temporary land use 
regulation may result in fluctuations in value.130  Nonetheless, these are 
simply incidents of ownership and do not justify compensation.131  The 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island132 
further evidenced this reasoning.133 
 
dominant case in the field of regulatory takings.  Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra 
note 51, at 214. 
127. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32. 
128. Freilich, supra note 16, at 594. 
129. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 777 
(9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 948 (2001) (cited in Freilich, supra note 16, at 594).  
Freilich explains that: 
Interim development controls and moratoria are fundamental to a rational, defensible, 
planning process. . . . [Courts] since that time have recognized that a temporary halt on 
development activity during a period of study is not only reasonable, but also ensures 
that [a] government acts in a manner that is thoughtful and deliberate, not arbitrary and 
capricious. 
. . . . 
The reasonableness of a moratorium is measured by both the length of its duration and 
its relation to the underlying studies supporting change in the regulations.  Thus, an 
enacting authority must diligently pursue completion of the planning process, 
including studies, analyses, public participation, and the drafting of legislation.  The 
need for the moratorium is justified by the need to pursue further study of the matter at 
hand.  If, however, having established a legitimate need, the government fails to 
pursue the necessary studies or to work diligently toward resolution of the matter, the 
substantive validity of the moratorium can be called into question. 
Moratoria have been set aside under substantive due process grounds when the 
restraint has been determined to be accompanied by studies unreasonable in scope, 
adopted in bad faith, or otherwise arbitrary or capricious.  Where the government 
enacts a moratorium with the intent of blocking a specific development, with no 
legitimate, good faith interest in addressing a larger planning or environmental 
concern, unlawful discrimination may be found. 
Freilich, supra note 16, at 600-01. 
130. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 
(1980)). 
131. Id. 
132. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
133. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632. 
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In Palazzolo, a landowner brought an inverse condemnation action 
against the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program 
(CRMP), following the enactment of a regulation that protected coastal wet-
lands.134  The landowner claimed that the regulation resulted in a taking of 
the landowner’s property without compensation and thereby violated the 
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.135  The landowner further asserted that 
the regulation deprived him of all economically beneficial use of his 
property.136 
In Palazzolo, the Court found that the landowner had not been deprived 
of all economic value because the property retained significant worth in its 
future developmental value.137  The Court specifically reasoned that “[a] 
regulation permitting a landowner to build a substantial residence . . . does 
not leave the property ‘economically idle.’”138  As a result, the Palazzolo 
Court ultimately held that a reduction in the value of property due to a 
governmental regulation is not sufficient to amount to a taking.139  Instead, 
a property owner must show that the regulation resulted in a deprivation of 
all economically beneficial value.140  Therefore, the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause had not been violated, and the property owner was not 
entitled to just compensation.141 
The Takings Clause has played a critical role in the development of 
federal takings jurisprudence.142  However, since this clause was made ap-
plicable to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause, it has also greatly affected state takings jurispru-
dence.143  Therefore, it is crucial to pay attention to the effect the Takings 
Clause and its state counterpart have had on the development of North 
Dakota’s takings jurisprudence. 
 
134. Id. at 614-15. 
135. Id. at 615. 
136. Id. at 615-16. 
137. Id. at 616. 
138. Id. at 631 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)). 
139. Id.  
140. Id. at 631-32. 
141. Id. 
142. See generally Foncello, supra note 45, at 667-68 (“The Takings Clause has become a 
hotbed of the Constitution, with its panoply of precedent stretching and twisting to fit into the 
year’s new litigation, potentially as numerous as the regulations that invade every aspect of our 
modern life.”). 
143. See Kirk, supra note 50, at 904 (discussing the effect of the application of the Takings 
Clause to the states). 
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B. NORTH DAKOTA TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
The North Dakota Constitution, similar to the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause, provides a guarantee that “[p]rivate property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.”144  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court determined that the state constitution provides an 
even broader protection for property owners against takings than the federal 
constitution.145  The North Dakota Constitution was intended to afford land-
owners the right to possess property in addition to those rights which make 
property valuable.146  As with the United States Supreme Court, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court has not created a set formula or clear guidelines in 
its takings jurisprudence.147  Therefore, to explain North Dakota’s takings 
jurisprudence, this section examines the progression of property ownership 
through an analysis of the state’s police power and eminent domain and 
inverse condemnation actions. 
1. North Dakota’s State Police Power 
Under the North Dakota State Constitution, the police power provides 
state and local governments broad authority to enact land-use regulations 
without having to compensate landowners for restrictions placed upon the 
use of their property.148  More specifically, government regulations and 
ordinances do not constitute takings of property for public use simply be-
cause they diminish property value or disallow the best and highest use of 
property.149  Instead, government regulations only constitute takings for 
 
144. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
145. Grand Forks-Traill Water Users, Inc. v. Hjelle, 413 N.W.2d 344, 346 (N.D. 1987). 
146. Id. 
147. Minch v. City of Fargo, 332 N.W.2d 71, 72-73 (N.D. 1983). 
148. L.A. Braunagel v. City of Devils Lake, 2001 ND 118, ¶ 16, 629 N.W.2d 567, 572; see, 
e.g., Hjelle, 413 N.W.2d at 346 (acknowledging the North Dakota Supreme Court’s recognition of 
the state’s authority to enact land use regulations under its police power); Rippley v. City of 
Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505, 507 (N.D. 1983) (providing that the state has broad authority to enact 
land use regulations under its police power without having to compensate landowners for the 
restrictions placed on their property); Kraft v. Malone, 313 N.W.2d 758, 761 (1981), overruled on 
other grounds by Shark v. Thompson, 373 N.W.2d 859 (N.D. 1985) (recognizing the broad 
authority of the state to enact land use regulations through an exercise of its police power); Eck v. 
City of Bismarck, 283 N.W.2d 193, 197 (N.D. 1979) (acknowledging the state’s broad authority 
under its police power to enact land use regulations without having to compensate property 
owners whose land has been restricted). 
149. See, e.g., L.A. Braunagel, ¶ 16, 629 N.W.2d at 572 (“A zoning ordinance does not 
constitute a taking of property for public use merely because it diminishes the value of the 
regulated property or disallows the best and highest use of the property.”); Rippley, 330 N.W.2d at 
507 (“[A] zoning ordinance . . . does not constitute a taking for which compensation must be paid 
merely because it diminishes the value of the regulated property or disallows the best and highest 
use of the property.”); Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 197 (“A zoning ordinance . . . will withstand 
constitutional scrutiny even though it diminishes the value of the regulated property or disallows a 
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public use when they deprive a landowner of all or substantially all reason-
able uses of their property.150  Additionally, when determining if a restric-
tion amounts to a taking, the court looks to the effect that it has on property 
as a whole, rather than the effect on individual interests.151 
The state’s power to impose land use regulations under its police power 
is not without limits.152  Regulations must bear a reasonable relationship to 
a legitimate governmental purpose.153  Moreover, these regulations must not 
be arbitrary or deprive a property owner of all, or substantially all, reason-
able uses of his land.154  Despite these limitations, the state’s police power 
remains an important method of internal regulation.155  The police power 
affords the state the ability to preserve public order and insures to property 
owners the uninterrupted enjoyment and use of their property so long as this 
use does not interfere with the identical rights of other property owners.156  
In addition to the police power, both federal and state governments also 
possess the power to take private property for public use through their 
inherent power of eminent domain.157 
2. Eminent Domain and Inverse Condemnation Actions 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has experienced difficulty distin-
guishing the State’s police power from its power of eminent domain.158  In 
fact, the court has specifically stated that: 
The characterization of the State’s action as a noncompensable 
regulation under the police power as opposed to a compensable 
 
use that the property owner considers to be the most valuable use of his property.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
150. See L.A. Braunagel, ¶ 16, 629 N.W.2d at 572 (reiterating the above stated principle); 
Rippley, 330 N.W.2d at 507 (providing that takings of this sort entitle a landowner to just 
compensation through claims of inverse condemnation); Kraft, 313 N.W.2d at 761 (stating that 
land use regulations must not “deprive a property owner of all or substantially all reasonable uses” 
of their land). 
151. Hjelle, 413 N.W.2d at 346-47.  In its application of this rule, otherwise known as the 
“parcel-as-a-whole rule,” the North Dakota Supreme Court has specifically relied upon Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).  Id.  Keystone asserted that a 
property owner possesses a bundle of property rights and “[t]he destruction of one ‘strand’ of the 
bundle [of property rights] is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”  
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 480 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)); see also Hjelle, 413 
N.W.2d at 347 (holding that a regulation, which deprived a property owner of one particular 
future use of their property, did not diminish the value or usefulness of the premises as a whole). 
152. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 197. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Thomas, supra note 52, at 501. 
156. Id. 
157. Slipka, supra note 46, at 179. 
158. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 198. 
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taking under the power of eminent domain is not susceptible to 
any easy formulation, but, rather, often turns on difference of 
degree.  [After all,] [b]oth involve some curtailment of private 
property rights.159 
The State’s power of eminent domain provides the state the authority to 
“take” or “damage” private property for public use if the private property 
owner is compensated for the taking or damaging.160  To enforce this 
power, the State effectuates a taking of private property through eminent-
domain proceedings.161 
In addition to eminent domain proceedings, inverse condemnation 
actions can be applied to situations in which private property has been taken 
or damaged without an owner’s consent and where condemnation proceed-
ings have not occurred.162  In these situations, an inverse condemnation 
claim may be brought to afford a property owner the constitutional guar-
antee of just compensation in the occurrence of a property taking.163  How-
ever, the North Dakota Supreme Court has explained that “[a] landowner 
cannot force a permanent taking upon [a] governmental body if the taking is 
reversible and the government wants to halt [it].”164 
 
159. Id. (quoting Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741, 755 (N.D. 1978), appeal 
dismissed, 440 U.S. 901 (1979)) (internal citations omitted). 
160. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 197.  “Just compensation in eminent domain [actions] has come to 
mean a fair market value standard of what a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller.”  Kirk, 
supra note 50, at 905. 
161. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 197.  The power of eminent domain is believed to be of political 
necessity.  Foncello, supra note 45, at 672. 
The sovereign would find it difficult, if not impossible, to construct highways, bridges, 
sewers, waterlines, or any other public necessities that may arise, without the power of 
eminent domain.  It would be difficult for the government to piece together enough 
voluntary transactions to complete one of these projects.  The high transaction costs 
associated with trying to find the landowners and then to successfully negotiate a fair 
price may deter progress and frustrate public goals.  The government can bypass these 
difficulties by exercising the right of eminent domain. 
Id. 
162. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 198. 
163. Id. at 198-99 (quoting Donaldson v. City of Bismarck, 3 N.W.2d 808, 817 (1942)).  
“Inverse condemnation is defined as ‘a cause of action against a governmental defendant to 
recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even 
though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking 
agency.’”  Foncello, supra note 45, at 673-74 (quoting United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 
(1980)).  Inverse condemnation claims are deemed to be inverse “because the landowner rather 
than the government institutes the proceedings for condemnation.”  Kirk, supra note 49, at 906. 
164. Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505, 511 (N.D. 1983).  Instead, under its police 
power, a governmental body can choose to rescind a regulation.  Id.  However, under these 
circumstances, the governmental body is still required to compensate the property owner for a 
temporary taking which is “measured by the time period between the date the regulation took 
effect and the date it was rescinded.”  Id.  On the other hand, if the government should choose to 
retain the regulation, the landowner is entitled to compensation for a permanent taking of this 
property.  Id. 
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Additionally, in Eck v. City of Bismarck,165 the North Dakota Supreme 
Court determined that an action of inverse condemnation must have 
substantial support.166  A property owner may not rely entirely on a mere 
reduction in their property’s market value to support his or her claim.167  In 
general, a property owner’s damage can be characterized as the special 
damage sustained in excess of that experienced by the general public.168 
In Eck, a property owner brought an inverse condemnation suit against 
the City of Bismarck for limiting the owner’s land uses by the city’s 
enactment of, and later refusal to amend, a zoning ordinance.169  The court 
recognized that “in every North Dakota case concerning an action for 
inverse condemnation . . . the alleged taking or damaging resulted from a 
[d]irect physical disturbance of a right, either public or private, that the 
property owner enjoyed in connection with his property.”170  In these cases, 
the government went beyond merely regulating private property use and 
 
165. 283 N.W.2d 193 (N.D. 1979). 
166. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 197-98. 
167. Id.; see also L.A. Braunagel v. City of Devil’s Lake, 2001 ND 118, ¶ 19, 629 N.W.2d 
567, 573 (“[A] mere reduction in the market value of property cannot serve as the basis for an 
inverse condemnation claim.”). 
168. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 199. 
169. Id. at 195. 
170. Id. at 199; see Filler v. City of Minot, 281 N.W.2d 237, 244 (N.D. 1979) (finding 
damages in the form of a loss of visibility between traffic on the highway and the landowner’s 
property); Guerard v. State, 220 N.W.2d 525, 529 (N.D. 1974) (“[A] [d]iversion of public traffic 
does not create a right to compensation.”); Maragos v. City of Minot, 191 N.W.2d 570, 572 (N.D. 
1971) (holding that the six year statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation 
action); Jamestown Plumbing & Heating Co. v. City of Jamestown, 164 N.W.2d 355, 362 (N.D. 
1969) (“[N]o legal damage results where traffic is diverted by authorities and incidental loss 
ensues.”); Wilson v. City of Fargo, 141 N.W.2d 727, 732 (N.D. 1965) (holding that a municipal 
corporation is liable for any consequential damages that result during an exercise of its eminent 
domain power); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Morton County, 131 N.W.2d 557, 568 (N.D. 1964) (finding 
that the state may be sued in cases arising under contract for damages resulting from the public 
use of private property); Kenner v. City of Minot, 98 N.W.2d 901, 907 (N.D. 1959) (determining 
that a landowner cannot recover damages for a public improvement unless it could not have been 
reasonably anticipated by the landowner); Little v. Burleigh County, 82 N.W.2d 603, 614 (N.D. 
1957) (holding that the relocation of a highway grade resulted in a taking warranting 
compensation); Kinnischtzke v. City of Glenn Ullin, 57 N.W.2d 588, 596-97 (N.D. 1953) 
(determining that a municipality is liable for the damages that occur as a result of its negligence); 
Conlon v. City of Dickinson, 5 N.W.2d 411, 414-15 (N.D. 1942) (finding that a landowner 
deserved to be compensated for damage to property that was both extensive and resulted in a 
reduction of the property’s rental value); Messer v. City of Dickinson, 3 N.W.2d 241, 252 (N.D. 
1942) (affirming the trial court’s decision which granted damages to a property owner as 
compensation for a nuisance maintained on the property); Hamilton v. City of Bismarck, 300 
N.W. 631, 634 (N.D. 1941) (holding that the City of Bismarck was not liable to the plaintiff for 
damages resulting from an unusual and unanticipated incident); King v. Stark County, 271 N.W. 
771, 774-75 (N.D. 1937) (applying the rule of reasonableness when determining if just 
compensation is required); Mayer v. Studer & Manion Co., 262 N.W. 925, 927 (N.D. 1935) 
(concluding that because the property owner’s claim was based on negligence, no “obligation to 
compensate for private property taken or damaged for public use” existed). 
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instead disturbed the owner’s property rights.171  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court hesitated to significantly extend the reach of inverse con-
demnation.172  Accordingly, the court refused to compensate the property 
owner for the City of Bismarck’s mere enactment of and refusal to amend 
an ordinance.173 
North Dakota courts are hesitant to support inverse condemnation ac-
tions because these actions can have severe consequences.174  For example, 
inverse condemnation actions can prevent or inhibit land-use planning and 
cause a community to suffer staggering financial burdens.175  However, 
claims of inverse condemnation can be useful and appropriate in certain 
instances.176  Specifically, these claims are appropriate when a governmen-
tal entity has prohibited all, or substantially all, reasonable uses of property 
and thereby displaced the property owner’s interest.177 
In Rippley v. City of Lincoln,178 a property owner brought a claim of 
inverse condemnation against the City of Lincoln following the enactment 
of a comprehensive zoning ordinance.179  This zoning ordinance rezoned 
twenty acres of the property owner’s land from residential use to public use 
in order to accommodate future construction plans.180  Following the enact-
ment of this ordinance, the City of Lincoln failed to initiate eminent domain 
proceedings or to compensate the property owners for the taking.181  As a 
result, the property owners began an inverse condemnation claim and 
asserted that the zoning ordinance constituted a taking of their land through 
its deprivation of all reasonable uses.182 
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the property owner’s 
inverse condemnation claim for just compensation was appropriate because 
the property owner had been deprived of all reasonable use of his 
property.183  The Rippley court reiterated the United States Constitution’s 
demand for just compensation when regulatory takings, and takings in 
 
171. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 199. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 200-01. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 201. 
177. Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505, 507 (N.D. 1983). 
178. 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1983). 
179. Rippley, 330 N.W.2d at 506. 
180. Id.  This zoning ordinance placed the property owner’s land in a public use zone, which 
was to be used solely for governmental purposes and prohibited all residential, commercial, and 
industrial uses.  Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 509. 
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general, occur.184  This demand requires that compensation be paid for the 
duration of the regulation from the moment that it first amounted to a taking 
until the date that it is rescinded or otherwise amended.185  A regulation is 
not rendered any less of a constitutional taking simply because the govern-
ment is able to rescind or amend the regulation and make it temporary in 
nature.186  Furthermore, in its decision, the court acknowledged that the 
Takings Clause does not require that a taking be both permanent and irrevo-
cable.187 
Ultimately, the Rippley court determined that a taking can be tem-
porary in nature and entitle a landowner to just compensation.188  As long as 
landowners are able to prove that a government regulation deprived them of 
all reasonable use of their property, landowners are justified in being com-
pensated.189  Nevertheless, the court stressed that landowners cannot force a 
permanent taking on the government if the taking is reversible and the 
government chooses to end the taking.190 
Takings jurisprudence at both the state and federal levels has evolved 
significantly yet continues to remain relatively unsettled.191  The Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause requirement that the government pay just 
compensation for any private land taken for a public purpose appears 
straightforward.192  In application, however, the question of what actually 
constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment has proven to be a question 
of considerable difficulty.193  As a result, the Takings Clause has become a 
source of frequent discussion under the Constitution as its precedent 
evolves due to the unending litigation that arises as regulations continue to 
invade many aspects of modern life.194 
 
184. Id. at 510. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981) 
(Brennan, J., concurring)). 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 511. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Foncello, supra note 45, at 667. 
192. Id. 
193. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (“The 
question of what constitutes a ‘taking’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a 
problem of considerable difficulty.”). 
194. Foncello, supra note 45, at 667-68. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
The decision in Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo,195 
written by Chief Justice VandeWalle, unanimously affirmed the district 
court’s holding that the City of Fargo’s moratorium on building permits did 
not amount to a taking of Wild Rice’s property under either the federal or 
state constitution.196  Three arguments were presented by Wild Rice as a 
basis for its takings claim.197  First, Wild Rice claimed that the moratorium 
amounted to a per se categorical taking.198  Next, Wild Rice claimed that 
even if the moratorium was not a per se categorical taking, a taking still oc-
curred under the Penn Central analysis.199  Finally, based on the principles 
presented in Rippley v. City of Lincoln, Wild Rice claimed that the City of 
Fargo was required to provide just compensation for the alleged taking.200 
Additionally, Wild Rice argued that the trial court erred in adopting the 
proposed findings, conclusions and order presented by the City of Fargo 
without affording notice to Wild Rice.201  Wild Rice also argued that the 
trial court erred when it allowed the city to include certain facts and case 
law in its findings and conclusions, which had not originally been deter-
mined by the trial court.202  The North Dakota Supreme Court found the 
argument to be without merit and ultimately held that “Fargo’s [twenty-
one]-month moratorium on building permits did not constitute a taking of 
Wild Rice’s property under the federal and state constitutions.”203 
A. CATEGORICAL TAKING 
Wild Rice argued that the moratorium imposed by Fargo amounted to a 
per se categorical taking of its development property because it denied all 
economically viable use of the property.204  Wild Rice relied upon the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas, which provided that when a property 
owner is required to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses of their land 
 
195. 2005 ND 193, 705 N.W.2d 850. 
196. Wild Rice, ¶¶ 1, 35, 705 N.W.2d at 852, 861-62. 
197. Id. ¶¶ 18, 21, 28, 705 N.W.2d at 856-57, 859-60. 
198. Id. ¶ 18, 705 N.W.2d at 856. 
199. Id. ¶ 21, 705 N.W.2d at 857. 
200. Id. ¶ 28, 705 N.W.2d at 859-60. 
201. Id. ¶ 34, 705 N.W.2d at 861. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. ¶¶ 34-35.  In addition to the trial court’s dismissal of Wild Rice’s inverse 
condemnation claim, the trial court also issued an order that denied Wild Rice’s post-trial motions.  
Id. ¶ 1, 705 N.W.2d at 852. 
204. Id. ¶ 18, 705 N.W.2d at 856. 
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for the common good, a taking has occurred.205  However, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court did not accept Wild Rice’s argument.206  Through its 
reliance on the decision in Tahoe-Sierra, the court determined that the 
taking in Lucas was materially different than the one alleged due to Fargo’s 
moratorium.207 
The moratorium imposed by the City of Fargo was merely temporary 
in nature, lasting only twenty-one months, and preserved the future value of 
Wild Rice’s lots.208  Distinguishing this situation from that in Lucas, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court stressed that the Lucas decision was carved 
out only for those “‘extraordinary case[s]’ in which a regulation perma-
nently deprives property of all value[.]”209  In all other cases, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court found that Penn Central provided the appropriate 
default rule.210 
B. PENN CENTRAL ANALYSIS 
The analysis presented in Penn Central has been recognized as a 
default takings rule requiring a fact specific inquiry.211  The three factors in-
volved in the Penn Central analysis are: (1) the economic impact of the 
regulation; (2) the interference with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions; and (3) the character of the government’s action.212  Relying on this 
analysis, Wild Rice argued that Fargo’s moratorium resulted in a taking.213 
1. Economic Impact 
Wild Rice argued that the first factor in the Penn Central analysis was 
met because it suffered an economic impact of approximately $500,000.214  
This economic impact resulted from the monetary investment placed in the 
 
205. Id. at 856-57; see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (deter-
mining that when regulations result in a deprivation of this magnitude a taking has likely occurred 
because it is less likely that the benefits and burdens of economic life are merely being readjusted 
by the legislature). 
206. Wild Rice, ¶ 19, 705 N.W.2d at 857. 
207. Id.  In Lucas, the property owner was barred from erecting any permanent habitable 
structures on his land which ultimately rendered his property valueless for both present and future 
purposes.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007. 
208. Wild Rice, ¶ 19, 705 N.W.2d at 857. 
209. Id. (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 330-31 (2002)). 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. ¶ 13, 705 N.W.2d at 855. 
213. Id. ¶ 21, 705 N.W.2d at 857. 
214. Id. ¶ 22. 
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property from 1992 through 1999.215  The trial court found that Wild Rice 
did not suffer an economic impact because it retained economically viable 
use of its property during the twenty-one months that the moratorium was 
in place.216  The court based this reasoning on the principle that “mere 
fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decision-making, 
absent extraordinary delay, are incidents of ownership . . . [and] cannot be 
considered a taking in the constitutional sense.”217 
Furthermore, Wild Rice retained future economic value in its prop-
erty.218  Because the moratorium was only temporary in nature, Wild Rice 
still preserved its ability to sell and develop the property when the mora-
torium was removed.219  The North Dakota Supreme Court also acknowl-
edged that: 
[T]he focus of the economic impact criterion is the change in fair 
market value of the subject property caused by the regulatory 
imposition measured by comparing the market value of the 
property immediately before the governmental action with the 
market value of the same property immediately after the action is 
terminated.220 
In this case, the trial court found that Wild Rice could sell its lots for 
higher prices post-moratorium than pre-moratorium.221  Where the property 
owner experiences a profit following application of a regulation, it is 
unlikely that a court will find that a taking has resulted.222  Therefore, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly found that 
 
215. Id.  These investments were primarily in response to governmental mandates such as the 
requirement of a public sewer system and road infrastructure, which the governmental entities 
required for development.  Id. 
216. Id. ¶ 23. 
217. Id. at 858 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302, 332 (2002)). 
218. See id. ¶ 25, 705 N.W.2d at 859 (“Wild Rice sold more lots at higher prices after the 
moratorium was lifted than it did before the moratorium became effective.”). 
219. Id. 
220. Id.  “The focus of [the economic impact] factor is on the change in fair market value of 
the subject property caused by the regulatory imposition.  In other words, the court must compare 
the value that has been taken away from the property with the value that remains in the property.”  
Leon County v. Gluesenkamp, 873 So. 2d 460, 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (internal citations 
omitted).  See, e.g., Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 115, 123 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (stating 
that the economic impact factor is to be measured by comparing the property’s market value 
immediately before the governmental action with the property’s market value immediately after 
the action); Leon County, 873 So. 2d at 467 (providing that the economic impact factor requires a 
plaintiff to establish that the regulation in question caused a serious financial loss). 
221. Wild Rice, ¶ 25, 705 N.W.2d at 859. 
222. Id.; see Leon County, 873 So. 2d at 467 (holding that no taking had occurred where a 
landowner sold their property for a profit of $500,000 following the removal of a temporary 
moratorium). 
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the temporary reduction in value suffered by Wild Rice was not sufficient 
to amount to an economic impact under the Penn Central analysis.223  The 
court then proceeded to analyze Wild Rice’s claim under the second factor 
of the Penn Central analysis, an interference with investment-backed 
expectations.224 
2. Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations 
Wild Rice argued that the moratorium interfered with investment-
backed expectations because it had invested $500,000 into the property but 
was unable to sell residential lots due to the City of Fargo’s imposition of 
the moratorium.225  Based on its findings, the trial court determined that 
although Wild Rice had projected it would sell four lots per year, it had 
experienced difficulty doing so since its creation.226  In fact, the trial court 
specifically found that many factors in addition to the moratorium affected 
Wild Rice’s investment over the years.227  As a result, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court concluded that “Wild Rice’s investment-backed expecta-
tions were unreasonable.”228  Following this determination, the court began 
its analysis of the third and final factor under the Penn Central analysis, the 
character of the governmental action.229 
3. Character of the Governmental Action 
Wild Rice argued that the City of Fargo’s governmental action was 
“characterized by bad faith.”230  Specifically, it claimed that the city used 
the moratorium to prevent construction on Wild Rice’s property.231  Wild 
Rice also asserted that the City of Fargo was attempting to obtain federal 
funding to purchase the property at a lesser price without the need for 
 
223. Wild Rice, ¶ 23, 705 N.W.2d at 858. 
224. Id. ¶ 24. 
225. Id. ¶ 22, 705 N.W.2d at 857. 
226. Id. ¶ 24, 705 N.W.2d at 858.  During the period of 1994 through 1998, which was prior 
to the imposition of the moratorium, Wild Rice had only sold one lot to an outside party even 
though it had enlisted a realtor experienced in river developments and had benefited from a two-
year tax exemption offer.  Id. 
227. Id. at 858-59.  The property where the lots were located was prone to flooding and all 
but two of the lots were covered by water as a result of the 1997 flood.  Id. at 858.  The lots also 
experienced additional flooding in 2001, and prospective buyers expressed concern regarding the 
potential for future flooding or water issues.  Id. 
228. Id. ¶ 24, 705 N.W.2d at 859. 
229. Id. ¶ 26. 
230. Id. ¶ 22, 705 N.W.2d at 857.  Wild Rice claimed that the city had not conducted any 
reviews or studies in order to create new ordinances that would be applicable to its property while 
the moratorium was in place.  Id.  Additionally, it claimed that the moratorium was lifted only 
after the impacted landowners brought claims of inverse condemnation.  Id. 
231. Id. 
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compensation.232  The North Dakota Supreme Court explained that “[a]n 
extraordinary delay in governmental decisionmaking coupled with bad faith 
on the part of the governmental body may result in a compensable taking of 
property.”233  The trial court determined, however, that the City’s morato-
rium was a reasonable and appropriate land use regulation based on the 
devastation and damage caused by the flood.234 
The City contended that it was necessary to use the moratorium to 
maintain the status quo.235  Moreover, the moratorium afforded the City an 
opportunity to prepare and review plans to correct problems caused by the 
flood and to prevent similar devastation from reoccurring.236  Additionally, 
the moratorium applied to all of the land located within the preliminary 
designated floodway, not only the lands belonging to Wild Rice.237  As a 
result, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded, in accordance with the 
trial court’s decision, that the moratorium bore a reasonable or rational basis 
to a legitimate government purpose and that the City of Fargo had acted 
with proper diligence and good faith.238  Additionally, based on its applica-
tion of the Penn Central analysis as a whole, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court ultimately determined that the City of Fargo’s temporary moratorium 
did not result in an unconstitutional taking of Wild Rice’s property.239  
Following its decision that Wild Rice’s claim did not amount to a taking 
under the Penn Central analysis, the court proceeded to address Wild 
Rice’s final argument that it was entitled to compensation for the alleged 
taking of its property.240 
 
232. Id. 
233. Id. ¶ 26, 705 N.W.2d at 859; see Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (determining that a taking can result when an extraordinary delay occurs in 
the governmental decisionmaking process); Appollo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 717, 
737 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (recognizing that takings can result from extraordinary delays in the govern-
mental decisionmaking process only upon a finding of extreme circumstances); Wyatt v. United 
States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (providing that takings may occur through 
extraordinary delays in the governmental decisionmaking process, but acknowledging that a delay 
must be substantial and that delays lasting up to eight years have been condoned by the Supreme 
Court); Byrd v. City of Hartsville, 620 S.E.2d 76, 82 (S.C. 2005) (holding that a two-month delay 
did not amount to a taking). 
234. Wild Rice, ¶ 23, 705 N.W.2d at 858. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. ¶ 26, 705 N.W.2d at 859.  The City of Fargo claimed to apply the moratorium in an 
effort to “determine if it was safe to build in flood prone areas.”  Id. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. ¶¶ 23, 26, 705 N.W.2d at 858-59. 
239. Id. ¶ 27, 705 N.W.2d at 859. 
240. Id. ¶ 28, 705 N.W.2d at 859-60. 
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C. COMPENSATION 
In its final argument, Wild Rice claimed, based on the principles set 
forth in Rippley v. City of Lincoln, that it was entitled to compensation for 
the temporary taking of its property by the City of Fargo.241  Wild Rice 
argued that it was entitled to compensation from the City of Fargo “for the 
interim period between the enactment of the moratorium and the date the 
moratorium was lifted.”242  However, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
determined that the reasoning employed in Rippley was not appropriate in 
this case.243  Unlike the property owners in Rippley who experienced a 
permanent taking and were deprived of all reasonable use of their property, 
the moratorium was only temporary in nature and did not deprive Wild Rice 
of all economically beneficial use.244 
Additionally, Wild Rice claimed that the City of Fargo failed to 
properly plead abandonment of the moratorium because the City did not 
allege in its answer or amend it to state that the moratorium had been 
removed.245  Wild Rice once again based its claim on the reasoning in 
Rippley, which the court found to be inappropriate because it did not 
specifically address pleading requirements in an inverse condemnation 
claim.246  Also, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that all parties 
were aware of the moratorium’s termination well before the beginning of 
the trial because the City had alleged in its answer that the moratorium was 
only temporary.247  As a result, the North Dakota Supreme Court deter-
mined that Wild Rice’s claim for compensation was meritless.248 
IV. IMPACT 
The likely consequence of the court’s decision in Wild Rice is that in 
situations of temporary regulatory takings, the appropriate method of analy-
sis will be an ad hoc factual inquiry, instead of a per se categorical rule.249  
A balancing test of this kind provides an accurate way to balance the 
interests of individual property owners against the importance of land use 
planning in our modern system.250  This balancing of expectations is the 
 
241. Id. 
242. Id. ¶ 32, 705 N.W.2d at 861. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. ¶ 31, 705 N.W.2d at 860. 
246. Id.  
247. Id. at 860-61. 
248. Id. at 861. 
249. Nolan, supra note 40, at 749. 
250. Id. at 749-50. 
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best way to determine the role that property should play in our society.251  
After all, this test is the sole means by which courts are able to take into 
consideration the notion of fairness and justice and produce a just outcome 
in takings litigation.252 
Although it is important to reach a fair and just outcome in takings 
cases, the court’s decision in Wild Rice also acknowledges the importance 
of land use planning devices.253  The court specifically discusses the impor-
tance of moratoria, which are recognized as “fundamental to a rational, 
defensible, planning process.”254  The decision is also highly supportive of 
the ability of governments to engage in land use planning and appears to 
epitomize the deference afforded to governments in their enactment of land 
use regulations through their police power.255  However, notions of fairness 
also reinforce the need for the moratorium power to be limited to prevent 
governments from exercising their power arbitrarily and in a way that 
inhibits public involvement.256 
The court’s decision in Wild Rice, like that in Tahoe-Sierra, failed to 
put a precise limit on, or to define circumstances under which a moratorium 
could amount to a taking.257  Instead, the court relied on the trial court’s 
determination that the moratorium was “reasonable” and “appropriate.”258  
The vagueness and ambiguity surrounding these terms will likely result in 
significant future litigation because the court will be forced to define what 
constitutes an appropriate and reasonable moratorium under the facts of 
each case.259 
 
251. Id. at 748. 
252. Id. at 749-50.  “Fairness and justice might suggest that the individual claim of right 
should be protected to the utmost extent as the foundation upon which the American system is 
built.”  Id. at 749.  However, “while land-use planning becomes more important in modern 
society, the desire for a practical arrangement and a conception of property that will work 
efficiently, and promote fairness and justice, must be the desired end of the Court.”  Id. at 749-50. 
253. Wild Rice, ¶ 23, 705 N.W.2d at 858 (referencing the trial court’s determination that the 
moratorium imposed by the City of Fargo was “a reasonable, appropriate land-use regulation”). 
254. Freilich, supra note 16, at 600; see also Dumas, supra note 69, at 236 (recognizing “the 
importance of temporary prohibitions on development for successful land-use planning”). 
255. See Oshiro, supra note 86, at 181 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Tahoe-Sierra, which involved a temporary moratorium and was not found to be a taking entitling 
the property owner to compensation, represented a “shift from a pro-property rights direction to 
one supporting land use planning”). 
256. Nolan, supra note 40, at 750. 
257. Id. 
258. Wild Rice, ¶ 23, 705 N.W.2d at 858. 
259. See Freilich, supra note 16, at 601 (discussing how the reasonableness of moratoriums 
is measured). 
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Also similar to Tahoe-Sierra, the Wild Rice decision appears to evi-
dence the North Dakota Supreme Court’s support of land use planning.260  
The decision could specifically harm property owners by enabling govern-
ments to simply label any prohibition or regulation as “temporary” or to 
place a set amount of time on a regulation to maintain its constitution-
ality.261  By allowing governmental units this luxury, the ability of North 
Dakota landowners to bring claims of inverse condemnation, and to obtain 
compensation for temporary takings, appears to have been significantly re-
duced.262  After all, courts are already hesitant to support inverse condem-
nation claims because these claims can have severe consequences through 
their ability to prevent or inhibit land use planning.263  Additionally, these 
claims can cause communities to suffer staggering financial burdens.264 
In 2006, the North Dakota Supreme Court’s decision in Knutson v. City 
of Fargo265 further limited the ability of property owners to bring claims of 
inverse condemnation.266  The court’s decision requires a property owner to 
prove that an alleged taking or damage occurred as the result of a deliberate 
act on the part of the governing body.267  The Knutson and Wild Rice deci-
sions reduce the remedies available to property owners and reveal the North 
Dakota Supreme Court’s support of land use planning.268 
As a whole, the Wild Rice decision is representative of the ever present 
debate regarding the meaning of property and the government’s role in both 
regulating and protecting private property.269  Moreover, although it appears 
to demonstrate a modern trend in support of land use planners, “private 
property has been in existence for a very long time and . . . successful 
societies and governments tend to protect rights in private property.”270  
 
260. See Oshiro, supra note 86, at 181 (discussing the fact that the Tahoe-Sierra decision 
represented the United States Supreme Court’s “shift from a pro-property rights direction to one 
supporting land use planning”).  In Tahoe-Sierra, “[t]he pro-property rights trend seemingly 
halted when Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, who typically sided with the conservative faction, 
changed sides and held in favor of the land use planners.”  Id. 
261. Nolan, supra note 40, at 750. 
262. See Knutson v. City of Fargo, 2006 ND 97, ¶ 15, 714 N.W.2d 44, 50 (requiring a 
landowner to prove that a taking is the result of a deliberate act). 
263. Eck v. City of Bismarck, 283 N.W.2d 193, 200-01 (N.D. 1979). 
264. Id. 
265. 2006 ND 97, 714 N.W.2d 44. 
266. Knutson, ¶ 15, 714 N.W.2d at 50. 
267. Id. 
268. See id. ¶ 15 (denying a property owner’s inverse condemnation claim); Wild Rice River 
Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 2005 ND 193, ¶ 27, 705 N.W.2d 850, 859 (denying a property 
owner’s inverse condemnation claim). 
269. A Short History of Regulatory Takings, supra note 72, at 43. 
270. Id. 
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Therefore, it is doubtful that Wild Rice serves to foreshadow a “long term 
abandonment of either individual rights or individual property rights.”271 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Wild Rice, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a temporary 
taking in the form of a twenty-one month moratorium did not constitute a 
taking under the federal and North Dakota constitutions.272  In this case, 
Wild Rice claimed that it was deprived of all economically beneficial use of 
its property during the twenty-one months that the moratorium was in place, 
and therefore, it was entitled to compensation for that time.273  The court 
determined that although a property owner may not possess a present ability 
to use his property when land use regulations such as moratoriums are 
imposed, future use and potential remains with the property.274  Therefore, 
the court’s decision ultimately determined that temporary takings do not 
render property valueless, and, subsequently, takings of this kind do not 
entitle property owners to just compensation.275 




272. Wild Rice, ¶ 35, 705 N.W.2d at 861. 
273. Id. ¶ 32. 
274. Id. ¶ 30, 32, 705 N.W.2d at 860-61. 
275. Id. ¶ 32, 705 N.W.2d at 861. 
 *J.D. Candidate at the University of North Dakota School of Law.  Special thanks to my 
husband Craig and my son Owen for their endless support, patience, and encouragement in both 
the writing of this article and the completion of my academic pursuits. 
